The Luftwaffe and the War At Sea, 1939-1945, As Seen By Officers Of The Kreigsmarine And the Luftwaffe

This is original source material provided by German military officers and sensitively edited into book form. It provides a fascinating insight into the German views of naval aviation and the war at sea – Most Highly Recommended.


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NAME: The Luftwaffe and the War At Sea, 1939-1945, As Seen By 
Officers Of The Kreigsmarine And the Luftwaffe.
FILE: R2676
AUTHOR: edited by David Isby
PUBLISHER: Pen & Sword, Greenhill Books
BINDING: soft back
PAGES:  288
PRICE: £16.99
GENRE: Non Fiction
SUBJECT: WWII, World War Two, Second World War, World War 2, Eastern 
Front, Leningrad, Red Army, sniper, sniper craft, rifle, German Army, 
war of snipers, NKVD, Smersh, counter intelligence

ISBN: 987-1-78438-244-5

IMAGE: B2676.jpg
BUYNOW: http://tinyurl.com/ycfwtvyv
LINKS:  
DESCRIPTION: This is original source material provided by German 
military officers and sensitively edited into book form. It provides 
a fascinating insight into the German views of naval aviation and 
the war at sea – Most Highly Recommended.

One caution with primary source books is often that they are 
designed primarily for historians and super-enthusiasts where the 
style can be somewhat hostile to others who are simply interested 
in the subject. In this book, the editing has been sensitive, 
resulting in a very readable book that has lost nothing in terms 
of detailed observation by those who were there. The text is capably 
supported by a fine selection of images embedded in the body of the 
book, many of these being rare images.

Germany, like many other countries, suffered from the battle between 
army, navy and air force. Better integration and co-operation 
between Kondor long-range reconnaissance and attack aircraft with 
U-Boats and German surface warships would have achieved devastating 
effect against Britain early in the war. By the time that 
communication and operation had been significantly improved, it 
faced an enemy who had moved even quicker and come to dominate the 
seas to the extent that submersible torpedo boats were forced to 
operate underwater for very much longer, using snorkel breathing 
systems and suffering the poor underwater performance of submarines 
that had advanced little since their introduction in WWI.

The Royal Navy realized very early on that they had been betrayed by 
their politicians who had refused to return all naval aviation to 
the RN in 1938. By continuing to maintain RAF control of maritime 
patrol and attack aircraft, the politicians had introduced the need 
for inter-service co-operation at a time when the RAF had been more 
interested in maintaining its empire than actually providing an 
adequate service in those areas that were considered peripheral to 
their main role. That meant that first priority went to Fighter 
Command and Bomber Command. Coastal Command was the poor relation, 
receiving obsolete machines considered no longer suitable for first 
line operation by the other two Commands. So the RN started out 
having to accept inferior maritime aircraft operated in their 
support by the RAF. To that was added the further major problem 
that the senior RAF officers were ill-disposed to RN needs in 
conducting the war at sea.

As a result, the RN employed innovative ideas of which one superb 
example was the 'jeep' or 'escort' carrier. These were ships that 
were either conversions of merchant vessels, or based on merchant 
hulls and equipment. They included covered hanger space and carried 
monoplane fighters and torpedo bombers. To augment this provision, 
and fill gaps quickly, the RN also employed MAC ships which were 
merchant vessels that continued to carry cargo but had a full flight 
deck and reduced superstructure to allow the space to carry, launch, 
and recover fighters and torpedo bombers at sea, although without 
weather resistant hanger space. This brilliant approach enabled 
'fleet' carriers to be reserved for their intended task force role 
and used 'escort' carriers to escort the convoys and to attack 
submarines and Luftwaffe patrol aircraft. This very quickly provided 
an effective counter that blocked the potential danger of Luftwaffe 
maritime aircraft. It also forced the U-Boats underwater where they 
were less able to stalk and destroy convoys. As resources caught up 
with demand, the RN and the USN were able to set up free roaming 
hunter-killer groups, based on escort carriers and anti-submarine 
corvettes, to hunt down U-Boats without having also to escort slow 
moving convoys.

The German officers recollections reflect this battle which they 
were soon losing. This book provides a comprehensive overview from 
the German perspective, challenging some of the myths that have 
become established the text, while and first rate supporting images 
also provide a view of the diverse aircraft types employed by the 
Germans in the naval aviation role.