The Cold War series is developing into a unique and insightful study of a long and bitter conflict that was far from Cold in many parts of the Globe. This edition looks closely at the Battle For Laos and features many rare images through the body of the book and in a full colour photo-plate section – Very Highly Recommended.
NAME: The Battle For Laos, Vietnam's Proxy War 1955-1975 FILE: R3028 AUTHOR: Stephen Emerson PUBLISHER: Pen & Sword BINDING: soft back PRICE: £14.99 GENRE: Non Fiction SUBJECT: Cold War, Domino Theory, Vietnam War, asynchronous warfare, tropical rain forest, Indo China, South East Asia, proxy war, surrogate war, United States, Australia, CIA, Special Forces
IMAGE: B3028.jpg BUYNOW: tinyurl.com/yy7mmzs3 LINKS: DESCRIPTION: The Cold War series is developing into a unique and insightful study of a long and bitter conflict that was far from Cold in many parts of the Globe. This edition looks closely at the Battle For Laos and features many rare images through the body of the book and in a full colour photo-plate section – Very Highly Recommended. The Cold War was 'cold' only in that neither the US nor the USSR wished to try their luck with a conventional invasion, or a nuclear exchange. Instead, they relied on proxies to open limited wars, claiming to be independence wars. The Soviet Union was reluctant to expose their regular troops in these wars, other than as 'advisors'. The US was rather less reluctant and their more belligerent approach was greatly aided by their Carrier Task Forces that could hold reinforcements and aircraft at sea beyond the reach of the combatants. The CIA has received much criticism, not least for their involvement in drug trafficking, torture and errors, but they were correct in spotting the Soviet Domino Policy that was essentially similar to that followed by Hitler before WWII. By encouraging conflict in one country, the Soviets tried to spread the conflict to neighbouring countries, gradually moving across the map and adding to their satellites. To the US, the progress of the conflict was a shock. They had expected to crush the insurgents with superior firepower and their reverses came as a bitter surprise. Many mistakes were made, particularly in under estimating the enemy, believing in technology over ideology, and failing to reign back the excesses of some of the US intelligence and military personnel engaged in the conflicts. The author has produced a well-researched and argued review of the Battle For Laos. Following the popular format of the Cold War series, there are a great many images used through the book in monochrome with some very interesting images reproduced in full colour for the photo-plate section. As with sister volumes in the series, this new book represents very good value for money.