The author has been described as the official historian to the British intelligence services and this book about the SOE provides a wealth of facts from a very shadowy organization. The evacuation from the beaches of Dunkirk and Churchill replacing Chamberlain saw a new aggressive posture against the Germans and efforts to take the war to them in Occupied Europe and then the Balkans – Very Highly Recommended.
NAME: Secret War, The Story of SOE, Britain's Wartime Sabotage Organisation FILE: R2961 AUTHOR: Nigel West PUBLISHER: Pen and Sword, frontline BINDING: hard back PRICE: £25.00 GENRE: Non Fiction SUBJECT: WWII, World War II, World War 2, Second World War, German Occupation, special forces, covert operations, airborne forces, paratroops, assault gliders, supply drops, civilians, D-Day, French Resistance, communist guerrillas, Free French, Gaulists, Balkans, Malaya, politics
ISBN: 1-52675-566-1
IMAGE: B2961.jpg BUYNOW: tinyurl.com/yxqhg7l2 LINKS: DESCRIPTION: The author has been described as the official historian to the British intelligence services and this book about the SOE provides a wealth of facts from a very shadowy organization. The evacuation from the beaches of Dunkirk and Churchill replacing Chamberlain saw a new aggressive posture against the Germans and efforts to take the war to them in Occupied Europe and then the Balkans – Very Highly Recommended. The story of the SOE has been told before but never with this level of authenticity. When the SOE was disbanded in 1946 a great many records were 'lost', some destroyed by SOE personnel, and some quickly moved into protective storage as Britain began to refocus on the Cold War. SOE had decided to back Communist guerrillas in France, the Balkans and Malaya and that created many problems, not least in France where the Gaulists began fighting the civil war they expected after liberation and saw Resistance Groups informing to the Germans on other Resistance Groups. In the process, many British agents were betrayed to the Germans and there was near war between British intelligence organizations. The author presents a cogent review of the SOE, no punches pulled. A skilled and acclaimed writer on intelligence organizations, he makes maximum use of his experience. Apart from some map illustration, this is not an illustrated book but the words paint vivid pictures. The jury is still out on whether the SOE contribution to the war effort was good or bad, overall, but a general consensus that it was naivety in the extreme. The leadership of SOE were utterly ruthless with their own people and in the many cover-ups. There was confusion about objectives and serious lack of co-operation with other intelligence services that had actually been carefully trained and deftly controlled. Many SOE agents were dropped into German hands before they could start on their assigned missions. The SOE gives a strong impression that it was a bunch of amateurs bumbling about in occupied territories with an almost complete lack of concern over casualty rates or the damage it was doing to other agencies and resistance groups.