The author has established a solid reputation for accurate aviation histories of WWII that add valuable knowledge and insights to the subject. If you think everything that can be said about the WWII air war has been said, here is a book to challenge your belief. – Most Highly Recommended.
NAME: Nachtjagd, Defenders of the Reich, 1940-1943 FILE: R2522 AUTHOR: Martin W Bowman PUBLISHER: Pen & Sword BINDING: hard back PAGES: 182 PRICE: £25.00 GENRE: Non Fiction SUBJECT: WWII, World War 2, World War II, Second World War, air war, bombing campaigns, Allied air fleets, German night fighters, command and control, strategic bombing, homeland defence, air superiority ISBN: 1-47384-983-7 IMAGE: B2522jpg BUYNOW: http://tinyurl.com/kfqp5u6l64epn2 LINKS: DESCRIPTION: The author has established a solid reputation for accurate aviation histories of WWII that add valuable knowledge and insights to the subject. If you think everything that can be said about the WWII air war has been said, here is a book to challenge your belief. – Most Highly Recommended. There are many myths circulating about WWII. One of the most durable is that Britain invented radar and the Germans knew nothing about it. The reality is that radio location was discovered in several countries at around the same time. Not everyone understood the enormous military and navigation benefits that were made possible by the discoverers. There may be debate about whether Germany or Britain was first or which had the best technology. The reality is that Britain developed technology that could be manufactured in volume and deployed to a chain of locations along the British coasts. Most importantly, it was integrated closely in a communications network that also integrated information from Royal Observer Corps watch posts to form a unique and highly advanced command and control network, the first of its kind in the world. That network then made very efficient use of the collected information to control the fighter defences against incoming bombers. As a force extender it more than made up for the great numerical disadvantage RAF Fighter Command faced during the Battle of Britain. It was impressively successful at controlling day fighter defences, but was less effective in controlling night fighters initially. That was more a case of night fighters requiring their own radar and more effective aircraft, weapons and equipment. It also required some changes in how the night fighters were deployed, controlling individual machines rather than squadrons, wings and Bader's Big Wings or Circuses. The Germans had little need of similar systems in 1939 because they did not expect any enemy aircraft to overfly the Reich. Goering, head of the Luftwaffe, is reported to have famously said, “If a single bomb falls on Germany you may call me Meyer”. It was anticipated that the Luftwaffe would move forward supporting the Panzer Armies in Blitz Krieg, and destroying enemy air forces on the ground before the enemy capitulated, achieving total air superiority. The miracle of Dunkirk destroyed that happy belief because it allowed enough British and French soldiers to evacuate to the British Isles and for industry to work miracles in providing equipment to replace that left behind. The Germans would now have to develop sea and air superiority to ensure the survival of enough soldiers and equipment to stand a prospect of defeating British troops on their own soil. That failed miserably, Hitler abandoned plans to invade Britain and turned his attention to the Soviet Union. It was an error of epic proportions. It left Britain as a concrete aircraft carrier from which to launch a growing strategic bombing campaign that was to denude German Armies of men and guns to provide for home defence against the aerial bombardment. It required aircraft and fuel to transfer home to provide fighter defence and it demanded a major new equipment program to produce the aircraft, radar, command and control and weapons to fight the greatest air battle of history. With his through research and clear writing, the author has provided an accurate and graphic account of how the Germans responded and built a credible radar-based air defence system that could function against the round the clock bombing by British and American air fleets. There was much innovation, and technical breakthroughs that were staggering, but in the end it failed to make the difference. By late 1943, the Luftwaffe had already lost the aerial Battle of Germany. The RAF had replaced most of their inadequate medium bombers with excellent heavy bombers, with the superlative Lancaster able to carry ten tons of bombs, including the devastating 10 ton Grand Slam 'earthquake' bomb. Bomb aiming sights had improved and radar aiming was being introduced. RAF losses were still horrendous but they were reaching their targets and replacing losses. The Germans faired even worse in daylight because the USAAF was now equipped with P51 Mustangs that could escort their bombers to all main targets in Germany. The RAF was also beginning to use the amazing Mosquito as an offensive night fighter to hunt down German night fighters. The German night fighter war might be summarized as, “Nice try but no toffee apple”.