Magnum! The Wild Weasels in Desert Storm

The authors are both experienced tactical pilots who have served in the USAF & Schreiner flew F-4G Wild Weasels during the desert campaign. This is a very important book that looks into the largely untold story of the electronic war that is critical to modern air warfare – Highly Recommended.


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NAME: Magnum! The Wild Weasels in Desert Storm
FILE: R2592
AUTHOR: Brick Eisel & Jim Schreiner
PUBLISHER: Pen & Sword
BINDING: soft back
PAGES:  274
PRICE: £19.99
GENRE: Non Fiction
SUBJECT: Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Op Granby, Middle East. Gulf 
War 1990-1991, AA suppression, ground attack, anti-radiation missiles, 
escort fighters, F-16CG, F-4G, HARM, SA-2, SAM

ISBN: 1-47389-900-1

IMAGE: B2592.jpg
BUYNOW: http://tinyurl.com/ydy4jbeh
LINKS:  
DESCRIPTION: The authors are both experienced tactical pilots who 
have served in the USAF & Schreiner flew F-4G Wild Weasels during 
the desert campaign.  This is a very important book that looks into 
the largely untold story of the electronic war that is critical to 
modern air warfare – Highly Recommended.

The subject of the electronic war is not only critical to understanding 
the modern air war environment, but it holds many lessons for those 
who would replace all manned aircraft with drones. The human component 
is adaptable in a way that computer managed autonomous systems are not, 
at least for the moment.

WWII saw the real introduction of the electronic air war. The RAF were 
able to fight off significantly greater numbers of enemy aircraft 
because the RAF was equipped with a unique integrated, radar fed, 
command and control system that also took in data from audible 
detection equipment and visual air observation. The Germans had been 
aware of some of the RAF progress and had used the airship Graf 
Zeppelin to conduct monitoring sorties in an attempt to produce a 
picture of how this electronic detection system functioned. That they 
failed, is the reason for their inevitable failure during the Battle 
of Britain. It set the point from which the rest of the war developed 
with electronics increasingly determining the outcome.

When the RAF and USAAF began heavy strategic bombing, the Germans had 
to work hard to develop electronic systems to assist their air 
defences in countering the raids. It was partially successful in that 
it caused very heavy losses for both the RAF and USAAF bombers, but it 
was not uncontested with counter measures and it failed to establish 
air superiority for the Luftwaffe in its home skies. What it did do 
however was to establish the pattern of air warfare from that point. 
Radar would be required to position fighters and aim AA Artillery. 
Integration of systems would be critical and fighter aircraft would 
require their own onboard radar systems during engagements and to 
direct the aircraft and the onboard missile systems. Radar and 
infrared guidance would be vital to directing missiles once they had 
left their aircraft for the target. Bombers and fighters would 
require methods of countering enemy detection systems and their 
related defensive systems.

By the start of the Gulf War 1990-1991, all combat aircraft had to 
be able to operate in an electronically hostile environment. An 
electronic arms race had been running since 1945, as the MkI eyeball 
and the canon were progressively replaced by missiles. Winning the 
electronic war would determine the winner of the whole episode of 
combat.

The audible ranging system is still in use and shows some promise of 
augmenting active radio systems in a heavily contested electronic 
environment, for the simple reason that it is a passive detection 
system. Its increasingly sophisticated and intelligent electronics 
can be built with TEMPEST protection to ensure that no measurable 
radiation escapes the detectors. In the same way, infrared detection 
systems can operate without betraying their position. These two 
systems do show some potential for further development, but they are 
essentially short range systems in a world were combat aircraft eat 
up distance very quickly. Everything else relies on active detection 
and ranging, with the result that it transmits radiation that can be 
detected by the enemy.

Given that radar is ground based, and now also based in AEW aircraft, 
for wide area detection of multiple targets, it presents potentially 
large targets to the enemy and relies on range to pick up incoming 
combat planes and missiles far enough away to be able to stop 
emitting before they come into the range of their payloads and to 
direct friendly fighters and Anti-Air systems onto the inbound 
threats. Additional radar systems are mounted directly on SAM and 
artillery weapons to direct fire on inbound enemy threats. However, 
the AA systems have a shorter time period before the enemy is able 
to fire on them. That requires great dexterity in use of radar to 
defend without disclosing fatally the positions of the AA systems.

ELINT is now a major part of the equation. In peace, and in war, 
aircraft and other assets are employed to detect and evaluate the 
electronic systems available to potential enemies. This intelligence 
is used to equip Wild Weasel aircraft to suppress enemy defences, 
ensuring that bombers can reach the targets in reasonable safety and 
deliver their payloads with the required accuracy and efficiency.

The authors have provided a detailed and understandable presentation 
of how Wild Weasel aircraft were employed during the 1990-1991 Gulf 
War. The descriptive text is reinforced with some excellent images 
through the book, including impressive full colour images.