The author has collected together and sensitively edited the thoughts and recollections of the key German Leaders. This exposes attitudes and capabilities of the German commanders and military leaders. In the process it does much to demonstrated why the Germans failed in the Battle of the Bulge and in the war. Extremely interesting and informative.
NAME: Hitler's Ardennes Offensive, The German View of the Battle of the Bulge FILE: R2418 AUTHOR: edited by Danny S Parker PUBLISHER: Pen & Sword BINDING: soft back PAGES: 264 PRICE: £12.99 GENRE: Non Fiction SUBJECT: WWII, World War 2, World War II, Second World War, counter offensive, last throw of the dice, Waffen SS, massacres, war crimes, Antwerp, Allied advance on Germany ISBN: 978-1-84832-909-0 IMAGE: B2418.jpg BUYNOW: http://tinyurl.com/j7gxnw6 LINKS: Current Discount Offers http://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/sale DESCRIPTION: The author has collected together and sensitively edited the thoughts and recollections of the key German Leaders. This exposes attitudes and capabilities of the German commanders and military leaders. In the process it does much to demonstrated why the Germans failed in the Battle of the Bulge and in the war. Extremely interesting and informative.
The Battle of the Bulge encapsulates WWII in Europe and the reasons for German failure. There have been many alternative history theories that claim the Germans came close to halting the Allies on the West Front. The simple reality is that they launched everything they had in an attempt to reach Antwerp and cut off fuel and ammunition, food, and general supplies to the advancing Allied armies, but the offensive was halted and thrown back. Looking at what actually happened, the conclusion is that the Germans never stood a chance. They struck a section of the Allies advance that was staffed by untried and under- trained US soldiers at a time when the weather was with them, grounding Allied air power. Even then, the US troops fought with determination and were reinforced, halting the Germans long before they could threaten Antwerp and close the port. Then the weather cleared and Allied ground attack aircraft flew in as large waves of bombers and rocket firing ground attack fighters, breaking the pockets of German armour with the Allies once more advancing. Had the Germans reached their objective it is very uncertain that it would have achieved the result they assumed. It would certainly have slowed the Allied advance on Germany and allowed the Russians to penetrate further into Germany, but the Allies would have still been able to bring up supplies from further South. They would also have been able to use their large transport air fleets to fly in supplies. As the Germans had committed everything they had, there was nothing else left to sustain them in holding Antwerp, much less any ability to drive the Allied armies back to Normandy. The Germans did not fully understand the agreement amongst the Allies to achieve unconditional surrender of Germany and the hope that reverses on the Western Front might persuade Britain and the US to join Germany in fighting the Russians were a useless fiction. What this new book does brilliantly is to expose the fantasies, and cynicism across the German High Command and the increasing disconnect from reality. In any war, every army contains leaders with strong ego-generated conflicts, but the Germans had turned this into an art form. The corrosive environment saw individuals fighting each other and contending for Hitler's ear and that was the way Hitler had always liked to have it. Some of the political soldiers demonstrated very poor military abilities and those with the best capabilities frequently did not have support from the Nazi elite.