Guderian Panzer General

A welcome new edition of a book, first published in 1997 by Greenhill, is packed with information and original insights. Guderian is the father of the panzer concept of armoured fighting vehicles with personnel carriers and artillery intendedUpload Files for fast moving warfare with air superiority and tactical bombing to ensure rapid mobility – Highly Recommended.


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NAME: Guderian Panzer General
FILE: R2598
AUTHOR: Kenneth Macksey
PUBLISHER: Pen & Sword, Frontline
BINDING: soft back
PAGES:  228
PRICE: £14.99
GENRE: Non Fiction
SUBJECT: WWII, World War Two, World War II, World War 2, Panzers, 
tactics, biography, re-armament, technology, armoured warfare, Blitz 
Krieg

ISBN: 1-52671-335-7

IMAGE: B2598.jpg
BUYNOW: http://tinyurl.com/y74oesx2
LINKS:  
DESCRIPTION: A welcome new edition of a book, first published in 
1997 by Greenhill, is packed with information and original insights. 
Guderian is the father of the panzer concept of armoured fighting 
vehicles with personnel carriers and artillery intended for fast 
moving warfare with air superiority and tactical bombing to ensure 
rapid mobility – Highly Recommended.

Guderian was one of a number of German officers who saw new 
opportunity in mobile armoured warfare. The origins of the concept 
are with a British army officer and papers from de Gaulle. All these 
officers were considering new operational concepts to avoid a future 
trench warfare on the lines of the WWI Western Front, but received 
muted support from fellow officers at a time when politicians were 
still trying to spend that illusive 'peace dividend'. Some work was 
already under way in secret bases in Russia to develop new tanks, but 
Germany was to immerge ahead of France and Britain because Hitler was 
eager to pour funds into re-armament. The hidden weakness of the Nazi 
program was that it depended on peace until 1944-1945. Hitler was 
dependent on a Ponzi scheme of financing that was providing high 
employment in the short term and supporting the expansion of the 
German military. When Hitler became over confident, as appeasers let 
him annex neighbouring territory, he assumed that he could continue 
to expand and declare war only when he had achieved superiority in 
arms and frontiers that the French and British could not resist. He 
also assumed that he could eventually come to an agreement with 
Britain that allowed him to swallow his mainland neighbours and then 
colonize the Soviet Union. History has shown him to be seriously 
mistaken.

For Guderian and his fellow blitz krieg advocates it was initially a 
good situation. The Germany Army kept expanding and new armour was 
being churned out of German factories. To complement the armoured 
fighting vehicles, the Germans were building a family of half-tracks 
to carry infantry and tow artillery, including PAK anti-tank canon. 
That enabled Guderian to build Panzer Divisions that were equipped 
with armoured and unarmoured mechanized vehicles that could be 
exercised and trained to achieve rapid advances under strong air 
cover. The weakness was that the German Army was growing faster than 
the new vehicles and guns could be turned out, leaving the Panzer 
Divisions as elite spearhead troops, with the bulk of the army still 
being horse drawn and on foot.

Guderian had to make the most of what he could get and was 
continuously dissatisfied with the quality of equipment and the rate 
of development. When his Panzers were sent into Poland, their German 
produced armour, PKW I and Pkw II tanks, left much to be desired and 
would have experienced difficulty if faced with British and French 
tanks at that date. Luckily they did not and were mostly resisted 
by Polish infantry and cavalry, who lacked nothing in courage and 
determination, but much in terms of modern equipment. One happy 
surprise for the panzers was the Czech Skoda 38t armoured fighting 
vehicle with its Christie-style tracks, good armour and an effective 
turret with a capable canon. This proved much more reliable and 
effective than the German designs at that stage.

The Pkw III was reaching the Panzers as the Polish campaign ended 
and this was better able to stand against British and French tanks 
in 1940, although it might have been a different story had the Allies 
been able to field similar formations to the Panzers, rather than 
using their armour in small isolated numbers. The Germans never 
really managed to achieve the equipment Guderian needed. The Panther 
and Tiger tanks satisfied him for the first time but were not 
produced in the numbers required and suffered breakdowns that should 
have been eliminated during development and initial production. As 
they came late in the war, they suffered from Allied bombing of the 
factories, which limited production rates and resulted in designs not 
being fully tested before service introduction. Their technical 
superiority was largely countered by the massive production by the 
Allies of armoured vehicles, with the US Sherman tank being supplied 
to exceed its rate of destruction and being up-armoured and up gunned 
to take on Tiger and Panther tanks effectively.

The author has provided a thorough and comprehensive study of the 
military career of Guderian. There are many valuable insights and the 
work is supported by an excellent photo-plate section. The publisher 
is also to be commended for bringing this unique work back into print.