A welcome new edition of a book, first published in 1997 by Greenhill, is packed with information and original insights. Guderian is the father of the panzer concept of armoured fighting vehicles with personnel carriers and artillery intendedUpload Files for fast moving warfare with air superiority and tactical bombing to ensure rapid mobility – Highly Recommended.
NAME: Guderian Panzer General FILE: R2598 AUTHOR: Kenneth Macksey PUBLISHER: Pen & Sword, Frontline BINDING: soft back PAGES: 228 PRICE: £14.99 GENRE: Non Fiction SUBJECT: WWII, World War Two, World War II, World War 2, Panzers, tactics, biography, re-armament, technology, armoured warfare, Blitz Krieg ISBN: 1-52671-335-7 IMAGE: B2598.jpg BUYNOW: http://tinyurl.com/y74oesx2 LINKS: DESCRIPTION: A welcome new edition of a book, first published in 1997 by Greenhill, is packed with information and original insights. Guderian is the father of the panzer concept of armoured fighting vehicles with personnel carriers and artillery intended for fast moving warfare with air superiority and tactical bombing to ensure rapid mobility – Highly Recommended. Guderian was one of a number of German officers who saw new opportunity in mobile armoured warfare. The origins of the concept are with a British army officer and papers from de Gaulle. All these officers were considering new operational concepts to avoid a future trench warfare on the lines of the WWI Western Front, but received muted support from fellow officers at a time when politicians were still trying to spend that illusive 'peace dividend'. Some work was already under way in secret bases in Russia to develop new tanks, but Germany was to immerge ahead of France and Britain because Hitler was eager to pour funds into re-armament. The hidden weakness of the Nazi program was that it depended on peace until 1944-1945. Hitler was dependent on a Ponzi scheme of financing that was providing high employment in the short term and supporting the expansion of the German military. When Hitler became over confident, as appeasers let him annex neighbouring territory, he assumed that he could continue to expand and declare war only when he had achieved superiority in arms and frontiers that the French and British could not resist. He also assumed that he could eventually come to an agreement with Britain that allowed him to swallow his mainland neighbours and then colonize the Soviet Union. History has shown him to be seriously mistaken. For Guderian and his fellow blitz krieg advocates it was initially a good situation. The Germany Army kept expanding and new armour was being churned out of German factories. To complement the armoured fighting vehicles, the Germans were building a family of half-tracks to carry infantry and tow artillery, including PAK anti-tank canon. That enabled Guderian to build Panzer Divisions that were equipped with armoured and unarmoured mechanized vehicles that could be exercised and trained to achieve rapid advances under strong air cover. The weakness was that the German Army was growing faster than the new vehicles and guns could be turned out, leaving the Panzer Divisions as elite spearhead troops, with the bulk of the army still being horse drawn and on foot. Guderian had to make the most of what he could get and was continuously dissatisfied with the quality of equipment and the rate of development. When his Panzers were sent into Poland, their German produced armour, PKW I and Pkw II tanks, left much to be desired and would have experienced difficulty if faced with British and French tanks at that date. Luckily they did not and were mostly resisted by Polish infantry and cavalry, who lacked nothing in courage and determination, but much in terms of modern equipment. One happy surprise for the panzers was the Czech Skoda 38t armoured fighting vehicle with its Christie-style tracks, good armour and an effective turret with a capable canon. This proved much more reliable and effective than the German designs at that stage. The Pkw III was reaching the Panzers as the Polish campaign ended and this was better able to stand against British and French tanks in 1940, although it might have been a different story had the Allies been able to field similar formations to the Panzers, rather than using their armour in small isolated numbers. The Germans never really managed to achieve the equipment Guderian needed. The Panther and Tiger tanks satisfied him for the first time but were not produced in the numbers required and suffered breakdowns that should have been eliminated during development and initial production. As they came late in the war, they suffered from Allied bombing of the factories, which limited production rates and resulted in designs not being fully tested before service introduction. Their technical superiority was largely countered by the massive production by the Allies of armoured vehicles, with the US Sherman tank being supplied to exceed its rate of destruction and being up-armoured and up gunned to take on Tiger and Panther tanks effectively. The author has provided a thorough and comprehensive study of the military career of Guderian. There are many valuable insights and the work is supported by an excellent photo-plate section. The publisher is also to be commended for bringing this unique work back into print.