Cold War, The Cuban Missile Crisis, Thirteen Days on an Atomic Knife Edge, October 1962

The publisher is achieving great success with this fascinating Cold War series and this volume covers the critical period of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviets greatly underestimated the resolve of the US and its allies, consequently suffering a humiliating if bloodless defeat – Very Highly Recommended.


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NAME: Cold War, The Cuban Missile Crisis, Thirteen Days on an Atomic 
Knife Edge, October 1962
FILE: R2651
AUTHOR: Phil Carradice
PUBLISHER: Pen & Sword
BINDING: soft back
PAGES:  128
PRICE: £14.99
GENRE: Non Fiction
SUBJECT: Cold War, nuclear war, Soviet Union, US, NATO, American 
nuclear deterrent, British nuclear deterrent, CND, Cuba, ballistic 
missiles, CONUS, naval blockade

ISBN: 1-52670-806-X

IMAGE: B2651.jpg
BUYNOW: http://tinyurl.com/yadbbwbf
LINKS:  
DESCRIPTION: The publisher is achieving great success with this 
fascinating Cold War series and this volume covers the critical 
period of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviets greatly 
underestimated the resolve of the US and its allies, consequently 
suffering a humiliating if bloodless defeat - Very Highly Recommended.

The Soviet Union mistook the Western civil demonstrations against 
nuclear weapons as proof of a decadent western society that was 
disintegrating and would blink first. It had been hoped to quietly 
build missile bases just off the US coast in Cuba without anyone 
noticing. Once complete, the bases would give the Soviet Union much 
leverage in blackmail and the opportunity to attempt a first strike 
war. It was also a reaction to the plans by NATO to establish US 
missile sites in NATO Member States that bordered the Soviet Union.

What the Soviets had not considered was the ability of the new U2 
'spy' planes to carry out photo reconnaissance at 70,000 feet beyond 
the range of any existing air defence systems. It is still not clear 
how much the Soviets knew about the U2 at the time, but they were 
certainly aware of flights over the Soviet Union itself and had 
failed miserably in attempts to shoot down the U2. It has been 
suggested that they assumed the U2 was a specialist aircraft that 
would only be used over the Soviet Union until such time as the 
Soviets could shoot down an example. They were confidant that they 
would soon have this capability and were unaware that the SR 71 was 
already being built to replace the U2 in hostile airspace and the US 
would use satellites.

The US had been monitoring Cuba ever since Castro came to power and 
the first indications of Soviet missile sites being built was soon 
obtained from U2 flights. What was even more important was that the 
US responded very quickly, put a naval bl;ockade in place and, with 
NATO, and British nuclear V Bombers went to full alert. The soviets 
were stunned by this demonstration and then discovered that they had 
no effective resources to challenge NATO at sea.

The two consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis were that the Soviet 
Union began building a blue water navy, and that the decline of the 
Soviet Union had begun. From this point the Soviet Union was sucked 
into an arms race that it could not afford. The US began to forge 
ahead in sector by sector, producing a lead in military capability 
that was significantly ahead of the Soviet Union. To this losing 
battle, was also added the direct knowledge that the US and NATO 
would not shrink from global nuclear conflict, no matter what the 
Soviet-funded CND demonstrators claimed.