Night Duel Over Germany, Bomber Command’s Battle Over The Reich During WWII

For six years, Bomber Command waged a strategic war over Germany at huge cost in terms of lives lost and aircraft shot down. The author, a former Phantom and Tornado navigator has written a well-researched book that captures the enormous bravery of RAF aircrew and the bitter battle fought nightly over Germany between bombers and night fighters. Most Highly Recommended.


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NAME: Night Duel Over Germany, Bomber Command's Battle Over The Reich 
During WWII
FILE: R2475
AUTHOR: Peter Jacobs
PUBLISHER: Pen & Sword
BINDING: hard back 
PAGES:  208
PRICE: £19.99
GENRE: Non Fiction
SUBJECT: Air war, carpet bombing, night fighters, Bomber Command, WWII, 
World War 2, World War Two, Europe, blitz

ISBN: 1-78346-337-6

IMAGE: B2475.jpg
BUYNOW: http://tinyurl.com/m3q86ex
LINKS:  
DESCRIPTION: For six years, Bomber Command waged a strategic war over 
Germany at huge cost in terms of lives lost and aircraft shot down.  
The author, a former Phantom and Tornado navigator has written a 
well-researched book that captures the enormous bravery of RAF 
aircrew and the bitter battle fought nightly over Germany between 
bombers and night fighters. Most Highly Recommended. 

The RAF fought a long war over Germany and for its early years lacked 
the necessary aircraft and equipment to fight the mission handed to 
its aircrews. From the start, casualties were very high and it took 
enormous courage to fly mission after mission, knowing that the 
chances of completing a tour were bleak.

At the start, the RAF rapidly discovered that it could not survive on 
daylight raids to Germany and Occupied Europe. It had neither 
adequately armed bombers, not fighters able to escort bombers to the 
targets. The Germans were similarly unprepared to mount an adequate 
anti-bomber defence. As the war progressed, it was a constant battle 
with one side briefly coming out on top, before new technology 
returned advantage to the enemy.

For the RAF, it had been formed primarily to wage a strategic bombing 
campaign against any emerging enemy, but a combination of poor senior 
leadership and money-pinching politicians had left it without the tools 
to fulfil its mission. Much of its experience between the two World 
Wars was spent using WWI aircraft to bomb tribal villages in the remoter 
reaches of Empire and Mandate. In 1939 it had a force of light and 
medium bombers, single and twin engine machines, that lacked adequate 
defensive armament and suffered a poor bomb load, with poor bombing aids. 
The best machine was the Wellington which was of unique construction and 
able to survive incredible damage. Even so, it lacked the bomb load 
necessary to wage strategic bombing at long range. Its saving graces were 
that its survivability made it loved by its crews, and its defensive 
armament of three power operated turrets, one of four guns and two of twin 
guns, augmented by two waist positions, each with a single gun. It was 
fortunate that the Germans initially lacked an effective radar-based command 
and control system and effective night fighters.

Where the RAF had suffered from funding restrictions pre-war and poor 
senior commanders, Germans suffered because they never expected to be 
bombed by any enemy and devoted their resources to supporting the army in 
lightning war. It also depended on single and twin engine light and medium 
bombers with flimsy defensive armament and inadequate bomb load for a 
strategic bombing role, but ideal for army support in skies dominated by 
day fighters. German development of radar and command and control systems 
was behind British development and the Battle of Britain was an unpleasant 
surprise. The initial bombing raids on Germany was an even more unpleasant 
surprise even though the majority of the bombs dropped failed to hit their 
intended targets.

The author has provided a vivid picture of this battle as fortunes ebbed and 
flowed for both sides as they strove to achieve air superiority in the skies 
over Germany. Inevitably, it mirrored the Battle of the Atlantic as U-boats 
and convoy escorts struggled against the sea and the tide of technological 
development. The U-boats also suffered appalling losses and were fighting 
essentially the same war as that waged over Germany by RAF Bomber Command. 
The U-boats had to cut the flow of supplies from North America and the Empire 
to Britain, and Bomber Command had to destroy the ability of the Germans to 
supply their military. Eventually the Allies won both battles because they 
were able to enhance their equipment and expand their capabilities at a faster 
rate than the Germans. That ability depended heavily on Bomber Command and the 
USAAF disrupting German war production and cutting their supplies of oil and 
raw materials.